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The Revolution of 1989 opened new prospects for bilateral British-Romanian 
relations in political, economic, and cultural fields. Elected in December 2004, the 
new Romanian President, Traian Băsescu, asserted his strong commitment towards 
Romania’s strategic partnership with the United States and strong ties with Britain, 
saying that ”the Washington-London-Bucharest axis will be a foreign priority for 
Romania”. Does this statement represent the recognition of the most important ac-
tors that dominate the international setting nowadays or is it the continuation of 
the previously good relations with Britain and the United States of America? 
This study analyses both the international setting and the domestic processes 
that took place in Britain and Romania during the Cold War. The emerging of new 
superpowers after the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
led to the reconsideration of British foreign policy, in terms of power, influence, 
and diplomacy. Meanwhile, Romanian foreign policy was being reshaped accord-
ing to the supremacy of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the establishment 
of the Warsaw Treaty and COMECON. The recognition of the bipolar world 
within which British and Romanian national policies were pursued is fundamental 
for understanding the relations between them. But an analysis of the domestic 
processes in Britain and Romania also provides a better understanding of British 
and Romanian foreign policies. I base this approach on the assumption that foreign 
policy is ultimately the external output of the domestic policy-making process1. 
Certainly, the imperatives of new internal and international demands faced by 
Britain and Romania after the Second World War influenced their relations. 
At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union succeeded in consolidat-
ing its control over the Eastern European countries. By the time of Yalta it was clear 
that the position of the armies would determine the political influence in Europe2. 
Having strengthened their military position in Eastern Europe, the Soviets bar-
gained at Yalta Conference of 3-11 February 1945 from a position of strength3. But 
the pattern of influences in Europe had already been decided by Churchill and Sta-
lin at Moscow in October 1944. The two mid-twentieth century leaders, behaving 
like ”eighteenth century monarchs or nineteenth century empire builders” agreed 
on ninety per cent British influence in Greece in exchange for ninety per cent Soviet 
                                                    
1 Michael SMITH, Steve SMITH, Brian WHITE, (eds.), British Foreign Policy. Tradition, Change 
and Transformation, Unwin Hyman, London and Boston, 1988, p. 9. 
2 T.E. VADNEY, The World since 1945, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; 
Markham, Ontario, 1987, pp. 36-37. 
3 Western Allies made no effort to interfere when Soviet Union armies entered Romania. 
T.E. VADNEY, The World …cit., p. 40. 
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influence in Romania1. One can argue that Britain continued its traditional policy of 
favouring a balance of power that led to the division of Europe into two spheres of 
influence2. Consequently, neither the British nor the Americans had given any en-
couragement to the clandestine efforts of the Romanian politicians to negotiate a 
withdrawal from the war that would have guaranteed an equal participation of the 
three great powers in the democratisation of Romania3. 
The Western powers did not even take into consideration the dramatic chang-
ing of side of Romania in August 1944 and the fact that Romanian armies had been 
fighting side by side with the Red Army for six months to clear the Germans from 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Even tough Romanian contribution to the defeating 
of Germans in Eastern Europe was substantial, Romania having the fourth largest 
army after the Russians, Americans, and British, the Western powers advised Ro-
mania to deal directly with the Soviet Union. Tough, soon after Yalta, Western rep-
resentatives began warning their governments that Soviet troops were directly as-
sisting the communists. As in the other eastern and central European countries 
with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the Communists in Romania enjoyed a very 
scant popular support and without the support of the Soviet Union they could not 
have taken the power4. However, Britain and the United States showed no desire 
to make Romania a test case in East-West relations. The Soviet diplomats contin-
ued to reassure the British and Americans that the Soviet Union was acting in full 
accordance with the Yalta agreements. 
British political representative in Bucharest, Le Rougetel, who was more pessi-
mistic about the Soviet intentions in Romania than most British officials reported 
the increased Soviet interference in Romania’s domestic affairs. But London 
warned him not to get involved and not to provide any advice or encouragement 
for the king and opposition leaders. The Soviet political presence in Romania was 
already massive. Besides the personnel of the government ministries, joint So-
viet-Romanian companies and civilians attached to the Soviet army, there were 
large numbers of secret police who had been sent to ”advice” the Romanian gov-
ernment and the Communist Party on political control and security issues5. Soviets 
agents were already engaged in a vast operation of striping Romanian oil industry 
of machinery and equipment, confiscating as war booty fifty thousand tons of oil 
equipment (originally British and United States property) and a large amount of 
railway rolling stock6. 
The enhanced position of the Soviet Union in Europe became the principal 
concern of British policymakers. The British ambassador in Moscow, Frank 
Roberts, was instructed to tell the Soviet leaders that the British ”found themselves 
                                                    
1 According to Sfikas, the mutual agreement between Churchill and Stalin reached in Moscow 
in October 1944 represents a ”vulgar manifestation of great power politics typical of the manner in 
which European leaders had been addressing Balkan issues for centuries”. Thanasis D. SFIKAS, 
”Toward a Regional Study of the Origins of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe: British and 
Soviet Policies in the Balkans, 1945-1949”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 17, 1999, p. 209. 
2 Albert RESIS, ”The Churchill-Stalin Secret ’Percentages’ Agreement on the Balkans, 
Moscow, October 1944”, American Historical Review, 83, (2), 1978, pp. 35-36. 
3 A.J. RIEBER, ”The Crack in the Plaster: Crisis in Romania and the Origins of the Cold 
War”, The Journal of Modern History, 76, (1), 2004, p. 63. 
4 Dennis DELETANT, Teroarea comunistă în România, Polirom, Iaşi, 2001, p. 19.  
5 Reuben H. MARKHAM, Rumania under the Soviet Yoke, Meador, Boston, 1949, p. 45.  
6 A.J. RIEBER, ”The Crack in the Plaster…cit.”, p. 74. 
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unable to consider the governments [of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary] as repre-
sentative or democratic within the meaning of the Potsdam decisions”1. Britain also 
complained that the Soviets were acting in the Allied Control Commissions of Ro-
mania, Bulgaria and Hungary without consultation with the British and the United 
States’ representatives2. According to the Armistice terms, the Allied Control Com-
mission was under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, act-
ing on behalf of the Allied Powers with a Russian executive staff3. 
Britain was, also, concerned about the excessive Soviet demands on the Roma-
nian economy. According to Sfikas, Britain’s renewed interest in Romania had 
nothing to do with freedom and democracy, but with the economic and financial 
policies of the Petru Groza government, especially with the fixing of very low 
prices for petroleum products4. This represents also Rieber’s point of view, who 
mentioned the attempt made by the British representative, Clark Kerr, to reduce 
the reparations figure demanded by Moscow from Romania. The attempt, how-
ever, was motivated by the worries that, ultimately, British oil interest in Romania 
would end up paying reparations to the Soviet Union5. 
During 1946, the Labour Cabinet and the Foreign Office became convinced 
about Stalin’s expansionist intentions in Eastern Europe. At Frank Roberts’s sug-
gestion a special ”Russia Committee” was created in the Foreign Office, to review 
weekly Soviet conduct and its campaign of Marxist propaganda6. At that time, 
British leaders were aware that the West could not change the development in 
Eastern Europe7. The large Soviet military and political presence had already influ-
enced the political shape of Europe. 
Despite the fact that the Declaration of Liberated Territories was approved at 
Yalta by the ”Big Three” guaranteeing free elections in Europe, no such elections 
were held in Romania. British protest on the falsification of the election did not 
meet any answer from the Romanian government8. The falsification of the results 
of the election was highlighted by Christopher Mayhew, the Parliamentary Un-
der-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office9, who negatively reacted to a proposal 
                                                    
1 Sfikas citing Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), series I, vol. VI, HMSO, London, 
1991, no. 5, p. 19: Bevin to Clark Kerr, 20 August 1945. Thanasis D. SFIKAS, ”Toward a Regional 
Study…cit.”, p. 220. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Alexandre CRETZIANU, The Lost Opportunity, Cape, London, 1957, pp. 138-143. 
4 Thanasis D. SFIKAS, ”Toward a Regional Study…cit.”, p. 220. 
5 A.J. RIEBER, ”The Crack in the Plaster…cit.”, p. 63. 
6 David REYNOLDS, Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Power in the 20th century, 
2nd ed., Longman, Harlow, Essex, U.K., 2000, p. 149. 
7 G. WARNER, ”From ’Ally’ to Enemy: Britain’s Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-1948”, 
in Francesca GORI, Silvio PONS (eds.), The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53, 
St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, pp. 293-309. 
8 On February 5, 1947, Professor Savory, a Conservative, the representative of the University 
of Belfast in the House of Commons, asked the Foreign Office if Romanian government 
responded to British protest regarding the election. He also pointed out that the opposition 
parties were let to obtain only 7 per cent of the total votes. Letter telegram, 5 February 1947, 12:30, 
Dossier ”Anglia”, vol. 10, the Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry. 
9 Christopher Paget Mayhew, Baron Mayhew, a Labour Member of Parliament from 1945 
to 1950 and from 1951 to 1974, when he left the Labour Party to become a Liberal. Mayhew was 
elected to Parliament from the constituency of Norfolk South in 1945. He became 
Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office where he served under Ernest Bevin. He proposed 
a covert ”propaganda counter-offensive” against the Russians by means of a Foreign Office 
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made by John Mack MP of the Labour Party for congratulating Romanian govern-
ment for its victory. Mathew asserted that Romanian elections had been not fair, 
nor free, they had not contributed to the British-Romanian friendship and, conse-
quently, there was no need to congratulate the Romanian government1. 
The British-Romanian relations which were broken off during the Second 
World War were official reopened on April 1st, 1946, when new political represen-
tatives, Adrian Holman and Richard Franasovici were appointed at Bucharest and, 
respectively London. The only agreement that existed between Britain and Roma-
nia at that time was the Armistice convention2. During the following year the Ro-
manian government made some efforts to have good relations with Britain. A dele-
gation composed of MPs and journalists ”known for their political sympathies to-
wards Romania and the Soviet Union” visited Romania in the summer of 1947 at 
the invitation of the Romanian Inter-Parliamentary Union3. Following his visit to 
Romania, L.J. Solley, MP, representative of the Labour Party, held a press confer-
ence ”Romania from the inside”, mentioning that he was received by King Michael 
and had interviews with Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Minister of Justice, Tudor Ionescu, 
Minister of Oil and Mines, Octav Livezeanu, Minister of Information and other po-
litical personalities. He also stated that ”There is complete freedom of speech and 
action for all democrats in Romania. There is no freedom to carry on fascist propa-
ganda or to indulge in anti-semitic activities”4. 
The relations between Britain and Romania changed dramatically in 1948, after 
the Proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Following the demand made 
by the Romanian government in 1948 for the recall of two members of the British 
Legation, the British government withdrew its First Secretary and its Commercial 
Secretary in January 1949. Furthermore, the Foreign Office informed the Romanian 
government that the presence in the United Kingdom of two members of his mis-
sion was no longer desired5. Tense relations between the two countries even contin-
ued in 1949 when the secretary to the British Legation in Bucharest was accused of 
being acted against Romanian Laws. The Note delivered by the Romanian Commu-
nist government mentioned that the British representative was ”found on July, 25th, 
together with the racketeers and smugglers” and accused of having deposited valu-
ables belonging to Romanian citizens at the British Legacy with the aim of crossing 
them illegally to Britain6. Moreover, Romanian government protested against the 
so-called ”arbitrary measure of reprisal” taken by the Foreign Office which stated 
                                                    
department to be formed specifically for that purpose. Lyn SMITH, ”Covert British Propaganda: The 
Information Research Department, 1947-77”, Millenium. Journal of International Studies, Spring 1980, 
vol. 9, no. 1 9.1, pp. 67-83. 
1 Letter telegram, 5 February 1947, 12:30, Dossier ”Anglia”, vol. 10, the Archive of the Ro-
manian Foreign Ministry.  
2 ”Referat, Bucureşti, 29 iulie 1948”, the archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry. 
3 Romanian Legation at London suggested that the invitation should include also MPs with 
other views, except for six MP with strong Romanian sympathies. ”Propunere pentru vizita la 
Bucureşti a unui grup de parlamentari englezi, 8 aprilie 1947”, Serviciul Presei Londra, Dossier 
”Anglia”, the Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry. 
4 Serviciul Presei Londra, September-October 1947, Dossier ”Anglia”, Press, Sept-Dec., vol. 10, 
the Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry. 
5 ”British Request to Rumania. Recall of Two of Legation Staff”, The Times, Wednesday, 
February 9, 1949, p. 8. 
6 Note delivered to the Foreign Office, October 18th, 1949, Dossier ”Anglia”, vol. 10, the 
Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry. 
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that the presence of the Romanian Economic First-Counsellor of the Romanian Le-
gation in Londra was no longer desired in Britain1. 
In October 1949, Mihail Macavei, the Romanian political representative at Lon-
don protested to Foreign Office against the negative image of Ana Pauker, the Ro-
manian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as appeared in an article published by Sunday 
Express. He was received by Bateman, the Permanent Under-Secretary in the For-
eign Office who reminded Macavei that press was free in Britain. Bateman also 
pointed out that Britain’s diplomatic relations with Romania were not among the 
best. In 1950s, Romania continued to develop a hostile foreign policy towards Brit-
ain. The Communist government accused the Third Secretary at the British Lega-
tion of spying and requested his leaving from Romania within 48 hours. The Brit-
ish Minister informed the Romanian government that, whilst the request will be 
complied with, the charges against the British representative would be repudiated. 
It was Ana Pauker, the Romanian Foreign Minister in the new Communist govern-
ment, who protested against ”the inadmissible activity of a member of the British 
Legation which constitutes a new hostile act against the Rumanian People’s Re-
public”. She claimed that ”Bucharest militiamen watched two men exchanging en-
velopes containing secret information on Rumanian internal questions”, one of 
them being British representative in Romania2. 
In the 1950s, Britain took a firm attitude regarding the Romanian infringement 
of human rights. British press informed the public opinion about the persecution 
that took place in Romania against the Church, the peasants, and the former offi-
cials. Newspapers also revealed Soviet economic exploitation through the joint So-
viet-Romanian SOVROM companies which controlled in varying degrees the oil 
industry, transport, coal, tractor-building, shipping, metals, and some lesser indus-
tries. It had been mentioned that Romania also exported foodstuff to the Soviet Un-
ion at a lower price that it could have obtained on the world market3. Britain’s rep-
resentative in the Economic and Social Council to UNESCO criticized Romania for 
violating human rights as set out in a resolution of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations and even voted against Romanian’s admission to UNESCO. Britain 
joined the United States, France, Turkey, China, Cuba, and Ecuador in opposing 
the resolution regarding Romania’s admission to UNESCO. Tough, Romania was 
admitted to UNESCO as a result of the agreement of ten members of the council, 
Russia, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Norway, Argentina, Australia, 
Egypt, India, and Pakistan4. 
Britain continued, however, to be interested in Romanian foreign policy. Tito’s 
visit in Romania in 1956 echoed in British newspapers, being regarded as a symbol 
of a virtual Romanian independence within the Warsaw Pact. The British also 
seemed interested to see ”whether Romanians – encouraged by this visit as the 
Yugoslav clearly wish them to be – will they seek to achieve an equal footing in 
their deals with the Russians”5. The British expectations regarding Romania were 
                                                    
1 Ibidem. 
2 ”Britain Ordered from Romania. Charge of Spying”, The Times, Saturday, July 8, 1950, p. 8.  
3 ”Communism in Romania”, The Times, Saturday, 29 August, 1953, p. 7 and ”Persecution in 
Romania”, The Times, Saturday, June 14, 1952, p. 7. 
4 ”Romania’s Admission to UNESCO, Geneva July 12”, The Times, Tuesday, July 13, 1954, p. 8. 
5 The Times described the way Tito was received by the Romanians officials, the leader of the 
Romanian Workers Party, Dej, and the Prime Minister, Stoica asserting that ”the manner of his 
receptions indicative of the extraordinary authority he now commands among the party leaders 
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accomplished during the 1960s and the 1970s, when Romanian leadership began to 
follow the same nationalist policy as Tito. Fearing losing economic autonomy as a 
result of the Soviet plans to integrate the economies of the COMECON states1 in 
which Romania would have a subordinate role as a supplier of raw materials and 
agricultural products, Gheorghiu-Dej proceeded with his own plans for the coun-
try’s industrial development2. 
The Consequences of Romania’s Defiance 
within the Warsaw Pact 
The conflict with the Soviet Union became acute in the mid-1960s, when the 
Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party asserted the right of Roma-
nia to develop a national policy in the light of its own interests and domestic re-
quirements3. Romanian-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate when Gheor-
ghiu-Dej involved himself in the Sino-Soviet dispute, declaring his readiness to me-
diate the conflict and even supported the Chinese position on the equality of com-
munist states. The stance adopted by Gheorghiu-Dej was continued by Ceauşescu 
who reiterated the independence of Romania and denied any other authority within 
the Communist block4. Tough Ceauşescu reaffirmed his party’s resolve to preserve 
good relations with both Peking and Moscow, he distanced himself from Moscow 
to get closer to China5. He also tried to identify allies in the non-communist world, 
among them, Britain, in order to counterbalance the control of the Soviets. 
The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led forces was a turning point 
in Romanian relations within the Warsaw Pact, marking the culmination of the Ro-
manian defiance of the Soviet Union6. Romania’s non-involvement in the reprisals 
                                                    
of Eastern Europe”. ”Romania Welcomes Marshal Tito. Gestures of Renewed Friendship”, The 
Times, June 25, 1956, p. 8. 
1 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was an economic organization of 
the communist states of Eastern Europe between 1949 and 1991 in which national economies were 
subordinated to an overall planning body. The military counterpart to the COMECON was the 
Warsaw Pact. Signatories to the treaty – the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania – agreed to unify their forces under one command. 
Yugoslavia, the only European Communist state not included in the pact, was expelled in 1948 from 
Cominform, the Communist information agency for refusing to acknowledge Soviet supremacy. 
2 The Times noted that ”Industrialization with priority for heavy industry remains the main 
target of the Communist regime”, underling the ”impressive” growth of over 10 per cent 
annually. ”Romania Keeps Her Balance – Steady Progress in Industrialization”, The Times, Friday, 
July 23, 1965, p. 10. 
3 Daniel NELSON, Romanian Politics in the Ceauşescu Era, Gordon and Breach Science 
Publishers, New York, 1988, p.180. 
4 One of these occasions was the Congress of the Romanian Workers Party that opened on 
July 20th, 1965, with Ceauşescu’s firm emphasis on Romania’s national independence and the 
continuation of industrialisation. ”Rumania Argues Case for Independence. Restoration of 
Traditional Ties with West Welcomed”, The Times, Tuesday, July 20, 1965, p. 8. 
5 In early 1972 Romanian General Ion Şerb was even arrested for giving the Soviet military 
attaché information about Chinese military arrangements with Romania. Daniel NELSON, 
Romanian Politics in the Ceauşescu Era, cit., p. 183. 
6 Dennis DELETANT, Romania under Communist Rule, Civic Academy Foundation, Bucureşti, 
1998, p. 89. 
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during the Prague Spring was perceived by the West as an act of political courage, 
which gave Ceauşescu considerable international prestige. Romanian defiance is 
perceived differently by various historians. According to Nelson, the stance 
adopted by Ceauşescu represented a threat to the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. No 
matter whether or not Ceauşescu was an authentic or potentially disruptive ele-
ment within the Communist block, the Soviet Union reacted by concentrating mas-
sive military forces on Romania’s borders in 1968 in an evident demonstration of 
force. The threat determined Ceauşescu to urge Romanians to defend the country1 
and to meet Tito in order to plan a common defence against the Soviet Union. Both 
Tito and Ceauşescu reasserted the necessity of full autonomy and of non-interfer-
ence of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Communist states2. 
As a result of its autonomous policy within the Warsaw Pact, Romania was 
considered to be a ”thorn in the side of the Soviet Union”3. Two ministers at the 
British Foreign Office, Steward and Amery, respectively Labour and Conservative, 
praised Ceauşescu’s stance. Steward visited Romania in 1968 and signed a Joint 
declaration. Julian Amery, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office in the early 
1970s, stressed Ceauşescu’s independence, his defiance of COMECON over indus-
trialisation, the denunciation of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the ab-
sence of Soviet troops on Romanian territory4. Britain also established trade rela-
tions with Romania in order to encourage its independent foreign policy. Obvi-
ously, the more economic ties Ceauşescu had with the West, the stronger his politi-
cal independence from the Soviet Union would become. The British attitude was 
later criticized by some historians who believe that Britain and other Western 
countries greatly over-estimated the degree of Ceauşescu’s independence from 
Moscow since Romania never posed a serious problem to Moscow. There are also 
historians who believe that Moscow was prepared to tolerate Bucharest’s limited 
deviation given the fact that communist party hegemony was not in danger5. 
Obviously, Romania never attempted to leave the Warsaw Pact, as Hungary 
did in 1956, nor was Ceauşescu a reformer like Nagy in Hungary or Dubcek in 
Czechoslovakia, even tough he posed as a Communist liberal leader6. Ceauşescu 
did, however, succeed in establishing relations with the West, being supported by 
the American Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford. The later wanted 
to point out: 
                                                    
1 There is a shorthand transcript of the meeting held by the Executive Committee of the 
Romanian Communist Party on August 21st 1968. The first to speak was Nicolae Ceauşescu. He 
began by saying that the meeting had been convened at 6.30 AM, following the latest news 
during the night news about the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Also, he announced that Patriotic 
Guards would be created as paramilitary units. These consisted of military trained of factory 
workers, peasants, students, and others. Daniel NELSON, Romanian Politics in the Ceauşescu Era, 
cit., p. 184.  
2 According to Daniel Nelson, the military policies of the Ceauşescu regime turned towards 
a strategy of national defence modelled after Yugoslavia. Ibidem, p. 183. 
3 The Times, 9 September, 1968, p. 7. 
4 Mark PERCIVAL, ”Britain’s ’Political Romance’ with Romania in the 1970s”, Contemporary 
European History, 4, I (1994), p. 79.  
5 T.E. VADNEY, The World …cit., p. 405.  
6 Referring to the fact that Romania had never made any move to break out the Warsaw 
Pact, an American official asserted ”Romania knows that there are limits beyond which it cannot 
go. The memory of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is still vivid”. ”Ford probes Brezhnev’s Iron Curtain”, 
U.S. News & World Report, 4 August, 1975. 
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”We are ready to keep moving toward better relations as fast as Roma-
nia thinks it is safe to go. Economic relations with the United States are ex-
pected to be strengthened in the next few months with the approval by Con-
gress of most-favoured-nation treatment for Romanian exports”. 
Ford also stated that the United States had no intention of luring Romania, Po-
land or any other Eastern European country out of the Soviet block believing that 
any attempt of that sort would provoke a forceful reaction from the Soviet Union1. 
Nevertheless, Soviet efforts to intimidate Romania were omnipresent during 
the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, including manoeuvres near Romanian fron-
tiers and economic pressures. Ceauşescu attempted to resist Soviet pressures by ex-
panding economic, political, and cultural contacts with Western countries, among 
them, Britain. Consequently, Romania’s ties with Western nations increased signifi-
cantly during the 1970’s2. After joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Romania developed its trade with the non-communist world and initiated economic 
relations with the less-developed countries3. As a result of Western trade conces-
sions and large foreign credits, Romanian enjoyed a prosperous economy in com-
parison with the previous period. Popular acceptance of Ceauşescu’s regime 
peaked also during his defiance of the Soviet Union because his military policy fla-
voured with Romanian nationalism appealed to anti-Russian feelings. 
Britain’s New Foreign Policy towards 
Romania in the 1970s 
The Romanian policy of autonomy in foreign affairs was encouraged by Brit-
ain. The climate of opinion among politicians and journalists in Britain in the 1970s 
was conducive to closer relations with Ceauşescu’s regime. Two Prime-Ministers, 
James Callaghan and Harold Wilson agreed that Ceauşescu achieved a well de-
served reputation as a world statesman. At the time, British foreign policy towards 
Romania was considered to be both politically and economically beneficial. Politi-
cally, the support given to Romania would weaken Moscow’s control over the 
Eastern block and economically it would benefit British economy4. 
At that time, the trade balance was a constant cause of Britain’s concerns. Fol-
lowing the oil crisis of 1973 Britain performed significantly worse than its major 
European countries. Increasing trade with Romania could therefore be seen as 
one of the motives for British-Romanian close relationship. Consequently, Harold 
                                                    
1 Ford’s intention in visiting four Eastern European capitals after signing the Helsinki Act 
was to ”demonstrate that the United States is not writing off Eastern Europe as an exclusive 
preserve of the Soviet Union” as it was perceived in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit. ”Ford 
Probes Brezhnev’s Iron Curtain”, U.S. News & World Report, August 4, 1975. 
2 The Economist reported that Romania was more independent of Soviet Union than the other 
Warsaw Pact countries, having the highest proportion of trade with the free world. The Economist, 
14 September 1968. 
3 In 1973 about 47.3 percent of Romanian foreign trade involved the capitalist developed 
nations leading to a large trade deficit that necessitated heavy borrowing from Western banks. 
During this period, major obligations to the IMF (US$159.1 million) and the World Bank (US$1,502.8 
million) were incurred. The International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. 
4 Mark PERCIVAL, ”Britain’s ‘Political Romance’…cit.”, p. 68. 
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Wilson signed a ten-year agreement on economic, industrial, and technical coop-
eration in 1975. The joint declaration reflected both countries’ desire for increased 
co-operation. As a result of bilateral contacts, Britain was the fourth largest ex-
porter to Romania behind the Soviet Union, West Germany and Italy1. 
If Britain was interested primarily in developing economic relations, Romania 
no less desired the same. At that time, it was keen to industrialise and needed sup-
pliers outside the Communist block because of Moscow’s reluctance to support in-
dustrialisation of Romania. As I already pointed out, in the 1970s, Romania at-
tempted to oppose economic integration within the Soviet block by expanding its 
trade with the West. In November 1977 the Romanian Foreign Minister, George 
Macovescu, visited Britain. During his four-day visit, he met British Prime Minister 
James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David 
Owen, and Secretary of State for Trade Edmund Dell. The two foreign ministers re-
affirmed their determination to develop relations of friendship and cooperation be-
tween the two states in all fields, and also announced that Romanian President 
Nicolae Ceauşescu and his wife Elena would pay a state visit to Britain the follow-
ing year at the invitation of Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke of Edinburgh. 
Close British-Romanian relations reached their climax On June 13th, 1978, when 
Ceauşescu began his state visit in Britain. The Queen praised him for his independ-
ent foreign policy within the Communist block, stating ”Today, we, in Britain, are 
impressed by the resolute stand you have taken to sustain the independence”2. To 
emphasize the friendship between the two states, Queen Elisabeth II made 
Ceauşescu a Knight of the Order of the Bath. In return, Ceauşescu awarded Elisa-
beth II the high order of the Star of the Socialist Republic of Romania First Class. 
Ceauşescu reasserted Romania’s desire for further collaboration with Britain, a be-
lief reiterated by the executive political committee of the Romanian Communist 
Party. According to the Romanian committee, the visit proved the importance of ex-
changing views between the two countries in the area of international relations3. 
The economic aspects of the visit consisted of a license to the Romanian gov-
ernment to manufacture 80 aircrafts and 225 Rolls-Royce engines4. Besides the 
co-operation in industry, other commercial agreements were approved. The Brit-
ish-Romanian statement reaffirmed both sides’ determination to increase the an-
nual volume of the trade by two and a half times the level of 19745. 
In the 1970s, Ceauşescu was considered as an anti-Soviet leader and his re-
pressive domestic policies were mentioned and publicized far less than his nation-
alistic foreign policy. With a few exceptions, in the 1970s, British articles almost in-
variably concentrate on Ceauşescu’s foreign policy without paying attention to his 
internal policies. Certain articles focused on Romania’s internal situation, but only 
few of them described the living standards and the shortcomings of the regime. 
                                                    
1 Mark PERCIVAL, ”Britain’s ‘Political Romance’…cit.”, p. 70. 
2 David SPANIER, ”Traditional Start for First State Visit by A Communist Leader”, The 
Times, Wednesday, June 14, 1978, p. 7. 
3 An excerpt from the ”Communiqué of the Meeting of the Executive Political Committee of 
the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party” was inserted in the book State visit of 
President Nicolae Ceauşescu to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 13-16, 
1978, Media Publishing House, 1979, p. 14-19.  
4 Referring to the agreement, the Queen mentioned the ”excellent cooperation” between 
Britain and Romania, particularly in the field of aviation. David SPANIER, ”Traditional Start for 
First State Visit…cit.”.  
5 ”Britain and Romania Sign 200 m Pounds Plane Deal”, The Times, June 16, 1978, p. 1. 
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The abuses of human rights that occurred in Romania were signalled to the 
British public opinion with the occasion of Ceauşescu’s visit to Britain. While a 
large crowd gathered along the route around Parliament Square and Whitehall 
for a sight of the procession of Ceauşescu and the Queen in carriages, a group of 
protesters, members of the British-Romanian association, were carrying a placard 
reading ”Human rights for Romanian Christians!”1. Tough the demonstration 
was authorized by the police, the protesters were completely obscured from 
Ceauşescu’s view by a police bus parked right in front of them2. The chairman of 
the British-Romanian association, Ion Raţiu, claimed that there was a deliberate ac-
tion to block the demonstration3. 
Referring to British foreign policy towards Romania, Raţiu stated that little 
practical purpose was served by arguing ”whether or not Romania’s foreign pol-
icy involved genuine defiance of the Soviet Union”. According to Raţiu, Britain 
should be aware that even tough Ceauşescu relied heavily on nationalistic appeal, 
and he professed a communist ideological purity which he constantly extolled to 
the party and country4. 
Among the very few British officials concerned about human rights abuses in 
Romania was Lord Chelwood, member of the Conservative Party. After Ceauşescu’s 
visit, he asked in the House of Lords, 
”which promises in the field of human rights – according to the 1947 Peace 
Treaty and to the Helsinki Final Act signed by Romania – had President 
Ceauşescu undertaken to carry out in return for the large increases proposed in 
the provision of British technology; and whether they will give any assurance 
that the latter is consistent in every respect wit our COCOM obligations”5. 
In his answer, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
Lord Goronwy-Roberts avoided being explicit regarding the issue of human 
rights. He merely stated that negotiations with Romania were based ”on normal 
commercial considerations”, expressing his belief that Britain and Romania ”will, 
indeed, derive very considerable economic and, it may be, political advantage 
from the agreement that we have so far concluded”. The political advantage 
drawn by Britain still remains an obscure. One can only suppose that Britain’s 
presumed goal in establishing close relations with Romania was to restrict any 
further Soviet expansion and possibly make inroads into Moscow’s sphere of in-
fluence. Lord Goronwy-Roberts pointed out only the economic advantages that 
Britain would derive, and the commercial benefits of the agreement, underlying 
that ”the total value to the United Kingdom of the Aerospace deal is likely to ex-
ceed 300 millions in the next fifteen years”6. 
It is hard, however, to believe that British officials were unaware of Ceauşescu’s 
internal policy. Then why, apart from the economic advantages underlined by the 
                                                    
1 David SPANIER, ”Traditional Start for First State Visit…cit.”. 
2 The Times, June 16, 1978, p. 5.  
3 The Guardian reported a similar incident on 13 June in which a London bus was driven 
in front of a group of Hungarian demonstrators. Mark PERCIVAL, ”Britain’s ’Political 
Romance’…cit.”, p. 84. 
4 The Times, June 22, 1978, p. 19. 
5 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Fifth series, vol. CCCXCIV, Session 1977-1978, 
Wednesday, 28th June, 1978, British Technological Aid. 
6 Ibidem.  
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Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was Britain still interested in 
supporting a fiercely independent but rigid communist state? Following the revo-
lution of December 1989, when former diplomats were questioned about Britain’s 
close relations with Romania in the 1970s, they said they believed that Ceauşescu 
could be turned into the sort of moderate, friendly communist leader that Tito had 
become, independent of Moscow and open to the West1. 
Britain’s New Attitude towards  
Romania in the 1980s 
In the 1980s, Ceauşescu’s infringement of human rights became notorious. He 
lost much of the credibility that he had previously gained through its defiance of 
Moscow. His efforts to silence all real or potential opposition within the country 
and the politically active exiles had a profound impact on the perception of the 
Romanian communist regime. Virgil Tănase, a dissident Romanian writer and, at 
that time, French citizen, accused the Romanian government of mounting a plot to 
assassinate him and another émigré, Paul Goma for campaigning for human 
rights in Romania2. Shortly thereafter, President François Mitterand cancelled his 
visit to Romania planned for September 19823. Romania reacted by expelling sev-
eral French journalists. Furthermore, Romania’s relations with the Western coun-
tries worsened rapidly. 
As a result of ”Tănase affair” and the stance adopted by Mitterand, represen-
tatives of fifteen member-countries of the ”Club of Paris” agreed to recommend an 
”adjustment” in the timetable for repayment of Romanian foreign debt to the 
West4. Romania was declared factually insolvent by a German ”think-tank” in 
1982. The institute also mentioned that the US government rejected ”possibly for 
political reasons” the Romanian request for a credit to finance a shipment of US 
corn and soya beans. Despite the readiness of the International Monetary Fund to 
make new loan to Romania, an action welcomed by the Western banks who ex-
pected a reschedule of Romanian debt5, Ceauşescu blamed the International Mone-
tary Fund and the high rates of interest charged by the Western banks. He decided 
                                                    
1 Amy HAMPARTUMIAN, ”The relationship between Britain and Romania during the Rule 
of Nicolae Ceauşescu, 1966-1989”, Arhivele Totalitarismului, no. 3-4, 2003, p. 56 citing The Inde-
pendent, 23 December and 27 December 1989 and The Telegraph, 24 December 1989. 
2 The Times published an article about the attempt to assassinate the two writers, asserting 
that ”in Ceauşescu’s orthodox Stalinist regime there is no room for criticism of his style of 
government”. The author of the article, Gabriel Ronay, mentioned also the fate of leaders of the 
strike at the Jiu Valley, dispersed throughout the country after the strike. Two of miners’ leaders 
died in separate and unexplained road accidents. Gabriel RONAY, ”Silence is Golden in 
Romania”, The Times, September 3, 1982, p. 5.  
3 ”Mitterand Cancels His Visit to Romania”, The Times, Thursday, July 29, 1982, p. 5. 
4 At the beginning of the 1980s, Romania was sliding into insolvency partly as a result of the 
Polish crisis that determined the international banks to cut the lending to Eastern Europe. The 
Times announced that ”Romania’s Foreign Debt Causes Concern”, Monday, November 30, 1981, 
p. 15. The following year, The Times warned on the insolvency of Romania, ”Report Puts Debt at 
$10,000m. Romania’Sliding into Insolvency”, Monday, June 14, 1982, p. 13.  
5 Poland and Hungary were also receiving fresh loans. ”IMF Ready to Make New Romania 
Loan”, The Times, June 23, 1982, p. 15. 
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to launch an austerity program in 1982 with the goal of paying off the foreign debt. 
Moreover, Romania announced that it will stop its principal loan payments due in 
1983, turning the inevitability of rescheduling into ”a useful piece of domestic 
propaganda”1. In making that decision, Romania followed Brazil’s ”indecent” ini-
tiative in stopping payments without waiting for bankers to concur in refinancing 
the capital repayment. Even tough these unilateral decisions were perceived as 
desperate measures they were a reminder of ”how international banks are finding 
themselves increasingly caught in circumstances they no longer control”2. 
The difficulties faced by Romania were also the consequence of its foreign pol-
icy. Unlike other COMECON countries, Romania refused to import and depend on 
cheaper Soviet raw materials. For instance, while other COMECON states were im-
porting Soviet oil 50 per cent below world prices, Romania was fully hit by the 
OPEC prices while also having to pay with hard Western currencies3. If the strat-
egy of distancing Romania from the Soviet Union was not an authentic one, as 
some authors claim, why was Romania continuing to refuse to trade with the So-
viet Union? Romania certainly resisted moves to integration in the Soviet block. 
However, it continued to face economic problems4 as trade relations with the 
Western countries declined. For instance, the value of Romanian imports from Brit-
ain declined from 261 million dollars to 89 million dollars between 1981 and 19895. 
In order to achieve the goal of paying off the foreign debt, the government cut 
imports and imposed restrictions on domestic electricity usage, set temperature re-
strictions for apartments, imposed a military discipline on workers in the energy 
field and even banned automobile traffic. Food shortages became usual as most 
foodstuffs were exported6. Romania’s domestic crises multiplied each year, leading 
to even worse records in human rights and social welfare7. Despite the popula-
tion’s extreme privation and human rights abuses, at the Thirteenth Party Con-
gress, the Romanian Communist Party leadership emphasized the need for disci-
pline, political and cultural centralism. 
The British media frequently highlighted the infringement of human rights in 
Romania and even drew a parallel between Ceauşescu’s repressive system and Or-
well’s 1984, but there was no sustained parliamentary campaign against Ceauşescu’s 
abuses in human rights field8. According to The Free Romanian, the continuation of 
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2 Ibidem. 
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same policy towards Romania represented a monument to the West’s failure to 
keep in touch with what was actually happening in Romania, being was irrespec-
tive of the fate of the Romanians1. 
None of the Ceauşescu’s repressive measures led to so many Western reac-
tions as the so-called ”systematisation” program. Ceauşescu’s intention was under-
stood by the Western states to be a plan physically to demolish seven to eight thou-
sand Romanian villages. Added to the demolition of churches in Bucharest and the 
disregard for Romanian architectural heritage, the systematisation plan led envi-
ronmental groups in the Western Europe to co-ordinate an international protest. 
The most effective in terms of attracting media attention and in providing moral 
support to Romanian people was the so-called ”Operation Villages Roumains” that 
recommended to Western European villages to ”adopt” Romanian ones. Conse-
quently, tens of thousands of letters sent from European communities to Romania 
and addressed to the mayors of Romanian villages proposed the ”adoption”2. 
The British campaign against ”systematisation” was supported by the Prince 
of Wales, who in an unprecedented political intervention condemned the program 
in a speech delivered on 27 April 1989. He highlighted that the purpose of sys-
tematisation was to create a new type of person, utterly subordinate to Ceauşescu’s 
policy. The Prince declared that he could not remain silent when ”the peasant tra-
ditions and ancient of a fellow European society are bulldozed to make way for a 
uniform and deathly mock-modernity”: 
”President Ceauşescu has embarked on the wholesale destruction of his 
country’s cultural and human heritage. What happened here in the 1960s is 
not comparable with policy known as ’systematisation’ which aims to trans-
form Romania’s cultural environment into over 500 urban collectives desig-
nated as ’agro-industrial complexes’. The object, which is very interesting, is 
to reshape the nation’s identity, to create a new type of person, utterly subor-
dinate to its dreams. To achieve this, President Ceauşescu has set about de-
stroying the cities and villages of his country and replacing them with blocks 
of flats which are a repetition of a failed 1960s social engineering, mixed with 
the atmosphere of George Orwell’s 1984. To achieve this plan, some 8,000 vil-
lages could be demolished, together with churches, ancestral graveyards and 
every connection with the rural people’s past”3. 
The ’Systematisation’ plan eventually ceased only as a result of Romanian 
revolution of December 1989 that overthrew the Romanian Communist regime. 
 
Exploring Britain-Romanian relations during the Cold War, I have pointed out 
the tense relations in the 1950s and the good relations in the 1970s when Britain en-
couraged Romania to pursue an independent national policy within the Soviet 
block. In the 1950s, the tense relations between Britain and Romania reached their 
                                                    
1 ”Why the West Should Look Ceauşescu Full in the Eye”, The Free Romanian. The Organ of 
the World Union of Free Romanians, April 1987, vol. 3, no. 4, p. 1. 
2 Western newspapers underlined that systematisation plan would change the rural 
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climax, with all the accusations of espionage directed against the British represen-
tatives in Romania. Britain also criticised Romania for violating human rights and 
even voted against its admission to UNESCO. In contrast to the 1950s, when the 
Romanian Communist regime was willing to obtain the Soviet support to consoli-
date its power, in the 1970s, the communist regime was interested in pursuing an 
autonomous politics. Therefore, it developed diplomatic and economic relations 
with the Western states. British foreign policy towards Romania also changed sig-
nificantly at the beginning of the 1970s, as a result of Ceauşescu’s international 
stance adopted during the Prague Spring. Apart from the Soviet leaders, Nicolai 
Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, he was the first head of a communist 
country to visit Britain. His official visit to Britain not only opened new prospects 
for bilateral relations in political, economic, and cultural fields but also helped him 
to consolidate his regime. 
British foreign relations toward Romania changed again in the 1980s. The se-
vere austerity introduced by Ceauşescu to pay off the country’s foreign debt, 
along with human rights abuses led to the isolation of Romania. In the late 1980s 
Britain adopted a more adversarial stance towards Romania, with even the Prince 
of Wales condemning Romanian domestic policy. Relations with Britain de-
creased as the situation of Romania worsened every day. The Revolution of 1989 
brought a fundamental change in the relations between the two countries and 
opened new prospects for bilateral British-Romanian relations in political, eco-
nomic, and cultural fields. 
